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without popular information or the means of
acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.
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coalition partners. A smooth flow of information, and hence the way
leading-edge technologies process and communicate information to key
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Interoperability has become critical to commanders at all levels.
This case study and analysis of interoperability by Dr. Sterling Ses-
sions and Dr. Carl Jones was spnmsored by CCRP. Though originally
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The ultimate goal is simple: give the battlefwld command-
er access to all the information needed to win the war.
And give it to him when he wants it and how Ise want it.
GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL'
1 Interoperabllity
General Powell's ambitious vision statement, in July 1992,
heralded a new era for interoperability: an era of budget
[ cuts, multinational services, and public clamor for con-
gressional efficiency. At the same time, specializea,
regionally based conflicts took the place of vast ocean and
S~huge land-mass battlefields.
lnteroperability has many facets. Its definition encom-
passes two radios talking to each other, an Ocean Venture
exercise, hardware and software matching, and cross-service
i 1
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training. It is "equipment, procedures, doctrine, and train-
ing" and "the ability of people, organizations, and equip-
ment to operate together effectively."2
During the Storm
Desert Storm typified the new era with its successful
melding of many units from many services and many
countries. But a lack of interoperability caused enough
tactical problems to give any seasoned observer pause.
"Communications for artillery fire support were a particular
problem because the (radio) equipment lacked 3ufficient
range or frequencies," according to one Marine General.
Some platoon leaders could not talk on the radio to squad
leaders "a mere 75 feet away,"3 said one Army battalion
Commander. These problems were part of a broader catego-
ry including hardware and software systems, functions, and
processes, all comprising an element of C'I system's
interoperability, or the compatibility of communications
hardware, as formulated by Dr. Stuart Starr (see below).
Policy decisions on role assignments were to blame for
other interoperability breakdowns. The Gulf anti-air warfare
ships, for example, could not exchange data directly with
the on-station E-3As (airborne warning and control systems)
assigned to cover the land-related portion of the Kuwaiti
theater. In contrast, the Gulf-based ships received airborne
early-warning data from shore-based Marine Corps tactical
air operation and command centers. These circumstances
hampered early detection and tracking efforts in that target-
rich domain.4 Admittedly, this illustration is more in the
domain of Command and Control wherein a Commander
"assigns forces in the accomplishment of a mission." But
whenever time is a factor, interoperability is, too.
In a similar sense, problems of operating procedure
were associated with the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The
_______,
SESSIONS AND JONES 3
Gulf ATO was an intricate, computerized, daily list of all
air asseti in a Joint Task Force (JTF) environment (see
Appendix A for a facsimile). From the ATO, strike mission
planners could obtain information about numbers of mis-
sions, squadrons assigned, targets, restricted operating
zones, low-level transit routes, drop/landing/extraction
zones, and air refueling areas. It did not specify tactics or
flight plans.
During Desert Storm ATO was an unusually effective
system yet not without imperfections. From one Naval
officer's vantage point, while the Air Force considers the
ATO "the playbook for the vastly successful Air Bowl...
We in the surface Navy, from our more parochial perspective,
remember it simply as the 300-page, 'Personal For,' flash-
precedence, randomly sorted message, rarely received before
the middle of the day to which it applied. The sheer bulk of
the document implies that the Air Force-whose own compos-
ers designed it--expected a lot more people around who could
make sense of it. The JFACC's (Joint Force Air Component
Commander) six-pound Air Tasking Order had to be picked up
in Riyadh at 0200, delivered to the carrier, and transferred to
the surface ships (usually a three to four hour mission). The
people who published this tome probably never envisioned that
a couple of junior enlisted air controllers on a three-week
caffeine high in the back of a combat information center would
have to flip through this six-pound chunk of fanfold paper on
their knees to find the whereabouts of a tanker for their combat
air patrol."'
Yes, but the data were "not user friendly," another Naval
officer responded. "The Navy and Air Force have since
learned a great deal about the process and have made prog-
ress in providing that data via other means."6
The ATO was to be transmitted in digital form through
personal computers, but the Navy's computers and software
I@
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; were not up to the volume of traffic. As a result, the ATO
Swas flown on Lockheed S-3A Vikings to the carriers.
The Air Force had its own problems in using the ATO
S~and initially sent it to its forces on F- 15 Eagles.! Eventual-
ly, the Air Force managed to double its data transfer
capability but had no hardware to spare for the Navy. Even
with the right computers and software, however, "the Navy
... would have been impeded by satellite circuit capacity
limitations."'
The arguments between the Air Force and the Navy
concerning centralized air control were not the only issues.
, ,After Desert Storm, Army Corps commanders criticized the
Air Force for targeting only 300 (15 percent) of the 2,000
Army-nominated targets.9
An Air Force officer justified this situation on the basis
of, (1) a two- to three-day lag in Army intelligence from
CENTAF and (2) a redundancy in the target lists. He also
said that half of the Marine Corps' sorties (150 to 200 a
day) were dedicated to MARCENT (Marine Corps Com-
mand Center) and therefore not available to the Joint Forces
Air Command Center (JFACC), which narrowed the effec-
tiveness of JFACC management of the air effort.'0 Central-
ized air command was superior to allowing theater com-
manders to operate relatively independently, he concluded.
Storm Workarounds
"We've come along ways from the bombing of Libya," said
another officer, where the Air Force took the west side of
the country and the Navy the east, "in a perfect recipe for
fratricide..
In the Gulf we ran the air offensive through a single manage-
ment. The CENTCOM was first located in August 1990 on a
parking lot in Riyadh surrounded by an "awesome" four-foot
$ I
.. I
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high fence-a satchel charge thrown over the fence corild have
destroyed the center. We soon moved to the basement of the
Royal Saudi Air Force Center and Ministry of Defense which
was a nice place to be. However, as far as bomb proofing was
concerned, there wasn't much protection since we had to leave
the doors open for the power cables which ran from room to
room.1
Cables also ran from the rooftop DSCS (Defense
Satellite Communications System) satellite terminal, over
and down the wall, through a window to the basement. The
, entire communications network consisted of a few voice
and data circuits routed through four tactical ground-based
terminals. Soon, this rudimentary system was enhanced al-
Slowing Desert Storm Commanders to talk to their counter-
parts in the United States. By January 1991 the number of
downlinks had increased from I to 118 with 12 commercial
satellite terminals in place. These gateways supported 324
voice trunk lines and 30 Automatic Digital Network data
circuits, all of which carried over 2 billion characters of
data message traffic daily.
One of the first major telecommunications challenges
related to a call completion rate to the United States of only
20-30 percent a day. It took the military and representatives
of AT&T and GTE three months to identify the problem as
incompatible signaling between tactical and fixed systems.
The solution was later found over a long weekend by
AT&T Bell Lab employees.
A second problem related to the communications
switches in the Army's new Mobile Subscriber Equipment
which would not work with the vintage-technology switches
in other services' equipment. The solution was derived by
JTC3A (Joint Tactical C3 Agency) over 17 days: new
software made the Army's switches work with the Ma-
rine/Air Force Level Circuit Switch and the French RITA
* _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
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communication system.
A third problem was created by the vast volume of
message traffic and the relative shortage of military satel-
lites to do the job. Commercial suppliers immediately
assembled 15 ground-based stations from off-the-shelf
components which handled 20 percent of the traffic during
the war.
Also in short supply were Global Positioning System
(GPS) receivers, known as Sluggers, which linked with the
Pentagon's 16 GPS satellites. Almost immediately over
8,000 off-the-shelf receivers,"4 the size of a paperback book,
were obtained to aid in mapping, clearing minefields, and
guiding the navigation of troops who swept through Kuwait.
"We have known for some time that we need to do a better
job of standardizing our data links and protocols: a more
widespread deployment of Joint Tactical Information
Distribution System (JTIDS) terminals will help in this
regard," commented one contemporary C3 player."
Th1ese few illustrations of workarounds focused on the
managerial responses to particular problems that were either
not anticipated or which came earlier than anticipated. Both
conditions suggest some framework for structuring
interoperability analyses to prevent such problems from
reemeiging.
Managlng Interoperabillty
Interoperability is somewhat like quality. It is an integral
part of an institution's output, always present in some
degree, a determinant of an institution's continued life- yet
difficult to define, pinpoint, and manage. Often it is seen as
a truism, something that is evident and expected. Once
someone derives a pragmatic, clear approach to coping
II
r~
SESSIONS AND JONES 7






Source: Stuart H, Starr, MITRE Corporation, "Perspectives on Co Interoperability,"
briefing at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 1990.
with interoperability, it may sound like "just common
sense" but it deserves attention.
A case in point is Stuart Starr's perception of the ele-
ments of interoperability. His Venn diagram shows that the
elements of interoperability are interrelated but hatve distinct
boundaries (Figure 1.1).
Operating procedures indicate the frequencies to use,
pattern of employment, and codes; compatibility of mes-
sages (the identification of message length, message field
contents, and order of the message fields). Data base
applications among systems must use the same formats for
records, for example, is it 10 May or May 10?16
Other definitions of interoperability are more strategic
than Starr's, but sometimes reach a point of abstraction that
AII
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makes implementation difficult. While general descriptions
of overarching goals are a necessary part of the process of
formulating any workable strategic statement, they must be
completed by details. The accompanying description must
analyze and explain (1) an institution's technological, legal,
and economic operating environment; (2) its competitionI , (which interservice rivalry in the congressional arena
constantly provides), and (3) its precise strengths and
weaknesses. Finally, all these factors must be evaluated in
terms of the values of the institution or what is important
to senior leadership.
Strategic Implcations for Interoperablilty
0C! for the Warrior, produced and published by the Joint
Staff in June 1992, documents the answer to General Colin
L. Powell's charge, "The time is ripe to set a course to
resolve our C'! interoperability issues." The document
resolves the interoperability issues in concept, but one of its
framers, an Army Colonel, questions how well it will work
in real life. "Interoperability gets to the worst of human
nature: giving up the short term to envision, plan, and pull
it off," he said. But, he added "We cannot afford any
longer to fix these elements later without an over-riding
process that leads from jointness to oneness.""
Turning to the demise of the Soviet Union, from threat
to world peace to now "having lunch with the Allies at
NATO, the Colonel said:
Once this took place we did Command and Control without
acknowledging the threat, anyplace, anytime in the world. This
was a classic stovepipe [systems] environment as indicated
particularly in Ernest Fury when no one had the same signals,
meaning that J6 was kept outside the huddle. These circum-
stances continued until the second day of Desert Shield when
an electronic connection was found to link the stovepipes
It I
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together. This was an ideal situation because we never want to
forae a sMandrdized approach on the Services.
"To accommodate Me principle I see
interopersbility as driving the train with standards being the
engine or locomotive ... enforc[ing] the standards... is not
an easy thing to do in Washington where the only game is
money, and the JCS has no leverage over the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS). This means that you
cai only exercise control over the expenditure of Service-
related dollars through policies and standards which affect the
acquisition processes. This is the major reason we are building
this concept into C0I for the Warrior.
Marine Corps General Harry W. Jenkins, Assistant
Chief of Staff C41T, reinforced that comment:
The Gulf War saw the first space/electronic assault based on
highly intelligent systems. It succeeded in many areas and
failed in others. It did prove that the Services will never again
operate independently; jointness is in. But, we must have better
performance standards as far as software is concerned to make
interoperability work."
Many of the managerial issues raised by these. officers,
relating to the tactics or implementation of interoperability
strategy, are part of the global interpretation of what
interoperability is, what it is designed to do, and when.
Some of the positions outlined in C'!for the Warrior show
how all such issues fit together:
Interoperability is the ability of systems, units or forces to
provide services to, and to accept services from other systems,
units or forces, and to use the exchanged services to operate
effectively together.
And, a more comprehensive, even strategic version in
the same document:
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Interopenibility encompasses doctrine, procedures, and training
as well as systems and equipment. It is the capability of
people, organizations, and equipment to operate effectively
together so that "every unit on the battlefield can share
information with every other unit on the battleground.""1
A final descTiption of the importance and meanings of
interoperability is contained in the National Military
"Strategy Document, which assigns interoperability Number
One priority." The ramifications of stressing interoperability
extend to: (1) technology: providing the means for exchang-
ing information among systems and users, through the use
of common standards and protocols designed into the
equipment and systems; (2) applications: providing a
common understanding of how information will be fused,2'
processed, and used; (3) data: to be freely shared and
¶ transferred among systems and applications without transla-
tion; (4) procedures and doctrine: requiring parallel devel-
opment among systems; and (5) equipment and systems:
Information Systems Agency (DISA) through the Joint
Interoperability Test Center (JITC).
Looking Ahead
Interoperability, in summary, has been illustrated and
defined, both from a tactical, managerial outlook and from
a strategic viewpoint. This will lead to a review of other
problems associated with Desert Storm, with subsequent
solutions: some temporary to meet the vital day by day
needs of the war, but most still in the process of being
solved.
A serious issue [with Desert Storm] was the lack of trained
users of the technology in U.S. forces. Most of the computers
were user owned and operated- -no special staff existed to
develop software, maintain the data, or provide quality control.
it I
I'I
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It was not uncommon to see a singular junior enlisted soldier
or officer act as the expert on a staff. Unfortunately, the
quality of their knowledge of the computer, its application, and
the data which it processed received little scrutiny from
superiors who were just as often ignorant of the limitations of•I the technology.22
¶i This statement focuses on the computer as the driver of
the nature of the message, which drive tactics, which drives
strategy. This Mituation is in sharp contrast to the conserva-
tive, traditional lines of thought wherein tcp leadership
derives and implements strategy, including a communica-
tions strategy. Now, with so many lateral information
systems in existence catering to text, voice, imagery, and
data links, it is often hard for the uninitiated to catch up,
and leaders can turn into followers.
The overwhelming amount of data produced and
disseminated during Desert Storm is another aspect of
computer information. Sometimes excessive amounts of
data forced organizations to focus on particular data sets,
which created blind spots for other information. Stories are
legion about the masses of computerized and telephonic
data generated during the operation, including 700,000
telephone calls and 152,000 telephonic messages daily.
"The services put more electronic communications connec-
tivity into the Gulf in 90 days thati we put into Europe in
40 years," according to Lieutenant General James S.
Cassity, Director of C3 for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
According to C0! for the Warrior, the administrative
power of information and information systems will serve as
a common denominator for future military engagements.
How the common denominator will evolve, in spite of
service rivalry, is precisely described:
The common global vision of CI for the Warrior is to create
. . .....
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for these joint war fighters a single view of military C%. This
view is a widely distributed, user-driven network to which the
Warrior "plugs in." This network provides seamless, secure
connectivity through multiple, highly flexible nodes to all other
operational elements and data bases (which are automatically
updated and from which desired information can be pulled) for
any assigned mission.
Looking ahead, if you were a "commander, director or
department head of interoperability" exactly what would
your job entail if you were to implement these Cl4 charges?
Once you had defined and determined the elements of
interoperability how would you manage needed changes?
What would you need to know to be responsive to the
greater economic and political environment where you have
to manage? How would you assess your present
interoperability status in terms of equipment, systems, and
personnel? On what basis would you determine your
overall goals and objectives? How would you establish the
requirements for moving from where you are to where you
would like to be, in keeping with strategic directions?
Aside from equipment acquisitions how would you set up
4 a training program for those involved with interoperability?
Training for what?
2 Looking Backwards
Any discussion of a "single view of military CT'' should be
-ooted in past attempts at jointness to the extent that it can
be. After all, only one Desert Storm has been fought, and
the explosion of communications technology over the past
15 years is without precedent. Times do change. Yet, the
past abounds with similar injunctions from seasoned
military commanders and civilian specialists. That hasn't
changed. For instance, back in 1982 Harvard Professor
1 MOM
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Tony Oettinger said:
Interoperability has been around so long that one wonders it's
not being killed with kindness. Everybody is so much for it,
and asking for such total interconnectivity, that people throw
up their hands at the cost and complexity-particularly
Congress and the appropriations committees. So nothing hap-
pens-which may be a sophisticated way of reaching the end
result desired in the first place, in keeping with service
autonomy.23
Oettinger's plain words sizing up the late 1970s and
early 1980s are linked to other informed observers' views
of the military scene:
The problem today (1980) as it was in the days of Pearl
Harbor is elementary. It lies simply in the institutional failure
to assign proper responsibility and accountability to major
operational commanders.'
Because there are four Services grappling with broad missions
in conditions of uncertainty and, at the same time, operating in
an environment of scarce resources, there is built-in conflict
between the services. The conflict will always exist, no matter
how you organize the Department of Defense. The Chiefs
[JCS] don't even want to open the unified command book
because it becomes a bloodletting when they do.2"
All the Secretary of Defense has to do is saddle up somebody
in the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and give him the
clout to enforce interservice integration. They've tried to do
that with the C31 position, but they've just never given it the
same authority and the responsibility to do it.?
Integrating the services and promoting a "single view of
military CT'' are admittedly different but related matters. In
times past, the particular role of each service as determined
by geography, precedence, and warfighting capabilities has
Ii
j_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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weighed against jointness for many of the reasons men-
tioned above. The question now, with Desert Storm as the
format and the attending resolve by those who fought in
that war to "never again be inoperable" is, "Will the JCS
with its C4 I and the Warrior be able to reach higher levelsj of interoperability by controlling acquisitions and establish-
ing common protocols and doctrines, for instance?" Will
service autonomy, as stressed by the above quotations, be
too much to offset? A comment by Army Colonel David
Bryan of the Joint Staff in May 1992 provides a clue:
JIEO (Joint Interoperability and Engineering Organization) will
establish the standards and architecture (for equipment includ-
ing software acquisitions) under a charter from its parent
organization DISA (Defense Information Systems Agency). I
can assure you this encroaching on one of the Services' last
protected domains was not their idea. It has created a fire-
storm here in the Pentagon.
Other Voices
Paul A. Strassmann, Director of Defense Information in the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, had this to
say:
The excessive emphasis on hardware platforms is not teriable
any more. We are going to go, as a civilization, towards
hardware as a commodity and therefore what matters is
software. You must make software [development] a repeatable,
defined, and managed process."
This attitude toward the acquisition of commercial
products, both hardware and software, as a dominant
procurement policy was substantiated by Desert Storm, ac-
cording to General John A. Wickham, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.).
Wickham wrote:
... .I.
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Many critics believe that NDI (nondevelopmental item or
commercial) equipment, which is not militarized or ruggedized,
will break down under field operations and fail to satisfy
military requirements. But NDI equipment in general continues
to perform superbly [re: Desert Storm]. As a result, much of
the controversy over NDI has been replaced with recognition
that the philosophy of off-the-shelf hardware and software
acquisitions for many applications makes good sense and must
continue.2 '
Representing the DOD, Strassmann continued his
description of future military engagements and consequent
military force struct~res:
It is the need of small, mobile, rapidly deployed (e.g., fighting
anywhere with 48 hours' notice) and locally managed, joint
forces that are going to be the focus of our efforts for the next
decade and mayba the next two decades. We must look at just-
in-time warfare with just-in-time information technology that
cannot be cooked, predetermined and prestaged according to a
war plan, because the chances are that in most of the engage-
ments we will never be able to execute a war plan that's on
the shelf, exactly the way that it's on the shelf.
Strassmann relies on Corporate Information Manage-
ment (CIM) to reinforce development of these objectives,
CIM integrates technology, organizational problem solving,
process redesign, and the warfighting doctrine into a whole.
However, this holistic approach of Strassmann's is not
meant to lead to centralization:
The objective of CIM is not to scoop everything up into one
giant galactic division, because that doesn't work... CIM
should never be looked at as an information technology
project, but primarily as the platform or rails on which a major
savings train will be able to proceed with speed, certainty,
accurateness, and neatness without derailing.29
_ ___ ____ _
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How do you square centralized, culturally autonomous
service-related viewpoints with Strassmann's and his
constituents' decentralized approach? Is his pursuit- of
jointness premature? How do you assess Strassmann's
definition of future military engagements and correspond-
* bing need for new military configurations? Is his argument
for almost exclusive use of off-the-shelf, commercial hard-
ware realistic? Is software the main determinant of
interoperable effectiveness?
3 Contemporary Solutions to Past
Problems
Many projects are underway to solve interoperability
problems associated with Desert Storm. The nature of
Desert Storm--a coalition of .19 nations, the battlefield
terrain, the adversary, its rapid execution, reliance on high
technology, dominance of the air, and minimal casual-
ties--qualifies the operation as a forerunner of one type of
future conflict. This assumes there will be no more global
wars.
To the contrary, many future armed conflicts will be
subconventional,° as in Bosnia and Somalia, with the
delivery of food and medicine by peacekeeping agencies.
Then there are the persistent conflicts as in Northern Ireland
with British involvement and in Lebanon with the Syrians
where no truce exists and a modest, yet tragic number of
casualties continues. Finally, in a third kind of
subconventional war the peacekeepers, though numerous
and well-armed, are overpowered by the peacebreakers
which triggers intervention with countervailing forces and
resultant casualties for the adversary. The Gulf war typified
this latter scenario and the mid-summer 1993 conflict in
Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina may also qualify.
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Again, the warfighting characteristics of the Gulf war
serve as a model of required factors; superb aerial recon-
naissance; satellite communications; highly technical
firepower with precise, accurate aiming capabilities;
airborne radar; extensive armor plating, and the necessary
electronics to make interoperability seamless, fused, and
flexible.
The most likely places in the world for extensive
.2outbreaks of war are
North Korea, with its acquisition of nuclear arms, and the
Muslim crescent running through south-west Asia and north
Africa, with its powerful combination of oil, Islam, and a long
history of anti-western resentment."
Are there similarities in these regions to that of the Gulf
war?
Far from the Gulf, geographically, was the summer
1992 exercise Ocean Venture, designed to refine jointness,
particularly in matters of Command and Control including
interoperability. A mythical island, Viarta, within the
Atlantic Command had been attacked by Jaguar, a neigh-
boring island nation. Viarta asked the President of the
United States for help. He agreed and asked the Secretary
of Defense to initiate crisis-action planning utilizing Colon,
another neighboring island nation, as a forward staging
S~base.
A task force of over 30,000 troops representing the
Army (82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions), Air Force,
Navy, Marines (28th Expeditionary Unit), Special Forces
and Coast Guard were to take and occupy Jaguar. At least
two major lessons were learned. First,
Enlightened as Ocean Venture was, its command-and-control
structure applied joint doctrine in a way that would stifle the
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fast-paced performance demanded of today's expeditionary
forces.""3
The reasoning behind this observation related to the Joint
Force Air Component Command (JFACC) component
approach to jointness. This approach is characterized by a
Joint Task Force (JTF) of three or four service components
such as the 82nd Airborne Division. In theory, a joint
commander can organize these components as he sees fit,
for example, working directly with an airborne division. In
practice, two or more airborne divisions, for instance, will
be combined into an Army Force (ARFOR). This means a
joint commander must go through the ARFOR commander
to reach the division commander, a cumbersome and time-
consuming process, and one certain to deserve the above
criticism concerning stifling fast-paced performance.
The second lesson, somewhat related, pertained to
Desert Storm's effective but cumbersome
ATO-"unfriendly" to users; incompatible with Navy PC's,
software, and satellites; and not interactive with the Navy
and Marines. Ocean Venture was expected to overcome
some of these handicaps.
i4' To establish JFACC for Ocean Venture, Air Force
General Walter T. Worthington, head of the Air Force
component was named to head JFACC with a Navy flag
officer to execute JTF-J3 (operations). Once the ATO had
been prepared, IFACC and the Joint Target Coordination
Board (JTCB) could modify it to reflect changes in battle
situations and JTF priorities. A major addition was the use
of the Modular Air Control Center's remote computer
terminals; an Air Force contribution that improved perfor-
mance. Finally, the ATO's length for 1,000 missions was
170 pages instead of Desert Storm's 300 to 700 pages.
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the interoperability and broader Command and Control
processes? One answer came from General Cushman:
No one in the exercise believed that the Atlantic Command
had found the final JFACC solution. Computerization and
better communications have improved its performance, and
new procedures provide concerned parties a better shot at
reflecting their capabilities and needs, but JFACC operations
still require substantial streamlining. Further, its process of
target coordination negotiation, not bad in principle, suffers
from the bureaucracy of the component approach."3"
What did Ocean Venture represent in terms of the
amount of time required to make changes? Again, are
Starr's four elements of interoperability applicable as a
method of diagnosing some of the problems Cushman refers
to? If not why not? What approach would you use? Is
there any relation to Cushman's description of JFACC and
interoperability? If so, what? If not, why not? Where did
interoperability really start and end in Ocean Venture?
4 Communications
To continue a discussion of contemporary changes while on
the blue waters, the Navy's Vice Admiral Jerry 0. Tuttle
maintains:
Ultra high frequency communications (UHF) are the weak link
in the command, control and communications chain. In future
conflicts, the Navy must possess super high frequency (SHF)
satellite communications for its theater and global communica-
tions requirements."
Tuttle's main concern is about jamming. He insists that
Saddam's jamming of the UHF satellite communications
would have created a difficult situation.
- I _ - - "4.
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A possible future trend was signaled with the Marine's
use of commeicial main frame computers and local area
networks (LAN) to handle the vast amount of data in Desert
Storm. From their force automated services center in Jubail,
Saudi Arabia, the Marine expeditionary force command ar-
ranged a file transfer of the ATO from Riyadh to Jubail.
Then, the air tasking orders were distributed to its units via
LAN, often in less than an hour. Similarly, Marine units
requested air missions through their air tasking officer who
would in turn, validate them and then send the requests to
CENTCOM. As to the extent and robustness of LAN during
the first 36 hours of the ground war, the Marine's local area
networks processed 1.3 million electronic mail messages
with no delays, outages, or system degradation.'
Local area networks are also part of the Army's future
plans. By using fiber optics, millimeter wave radio, and
antenna multiplexing, LAN networks will be protect-
ed against electronic and visual interception. The networks
will possess multiple attributes including voice, digital data,
facsimile, graphics, and video imagery."
Many of the newer developments relate to a joint
interoperability standard which is currently being estab-
lished by and for the Department of Defense. Once there is
a standard that qualifies and defines data elements, data
base, and communication protocols, information can be
exchanged among machines. Such an exchange will allow
machines "to perform totally different functions in totally
different ways using totally different software and lan-
guages.""• This situation represents interface commonality
as determined by the joint interoperability standard. As a
consequence the electronics industry is searching for
systems and techniques to:
. -t- . - ~
r 3
SESSIONS AND JONES 21
Provide inexpensive interchanges (via translators) among
command and control systems ... to achieve over the longer
term an integrated and interoperable command and control
system to support combat commanders.31
It is evident from this approach that the objectives and
general directions of CIM are compatible with the Joint
Chief's attempt to enhance interoperability through C'lfor
the Warrior. An illustration of how far both entities have
proceeded along a common path is JOTS (Joint Operations
Tactical Systems) in regard to geographic'al position
reporting (GPS). This system and its instrumentation is
valid for many functions within DOD; some apart from
direct military consequence. A similar joint use of an
information system by combined forces in South Korea was
TACCIMS (Theater Automated Command and Control
Information Management System).
Standards alone, of course, will not assure
interoperability; they are merely a beginning. A much
broader framework exists and will exist on the assumption
that:
Each Service will bring its own command and control system
to the fray including the Army tactical command and control
system (ATCCS), the Navy's Copernicus architecture, the
Marine Corps tactical command and control system and the Air
Force contingency tactical air control planning system
(CTAPS).... Each Service brings unique capabilities that
make joint warfare effective.38
5 Making the Most of Information
Most of the people quoted here place no price tag on
planned changes, acquisitions, etc., which perhaps reflects
the sensitive and classified nature of such information. They
treat information as a free good in the sense that just saying
.,, - A'
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that "total interoperability" is a justifiable goal makes it so.
But this approach is not realistic. What is needed is
enough" information, similar to inventory management
models where the costs of ordering inventory are balanced
against storage costs and estimated demand and prescribed
service levels are the other dimensions. For instance, virtual
certainty about information that shapes battle-management
decisions Will cost a commander more than will 85 percent
i certainty.
Additionally. the future outlook for interoperability
places the process in a "pull" mode wherein a commander
seeks the information he needs to make a decision. This
contrasts with a "push" mode where a commander is
provided with the information someone else thinks he
needs. The assumption underlying the pull mode is that
commanders know better than anyone else what kind of
information they need and when they need it- -a classical
entrepreneurial or decentralized approach.
A major argument for the pull model is to avoid
information overload, being at the bottom of a funnel
brimming with information from many sources. This
argument also assumes that an individual can avoid infor-
mation overload at will. But exactly what are ideal informa-
tion levels? How are they derived? How is the value of
information determined?
6 Joint Systems Interopembility
It is going to take a long time to reach the degree of
interoperability described by General Colin L. Powell: "all
the information needed to win the war.., when he watits
it and how he wants it."
C'! for the Warrior recognized this dynamic situation
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with its portrayal of: (1) an immediate or quick fix phase,
!f perhaps during the 1990s, merging into, (2) a mid-term
phase, into the early 2000s, and (3) a final phase thereafter.
The last phase would embrace many of the far-out, almost
fantasy-laden inventions and processes that futurists speak
of today. With some very basic artificial intelligence models
already in place, modest movement toward the dream has
taken place. Additional esoterica such as, "multilevel
security solutions using a multiple layer concept for encryp-
tion, combined with electronic, benign, transparent crypto-
graphic kWy distribution, automated key management
approaches, and data compression and transmission technol-
ogies,"3 9 will undoubtedly occupy the interests of those in
defense-related research and development for many years.
In the meantime, two interoperability assets JTIDS
(Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) and
IRIDIUM (telecommunications network) continue to attract
considerable developmental involvement from both public
and private sectors. JTIDS dates back to the late 1960s and,
25 years later may find new applications, beyond AWACs
and F- 15s, when JTID equipment is placed on F- 14 and F-
:. 16 aircraft in the mid-1990s. The lessons learned from this
extraordinary technological development and the people
who have resisted it could be instructive to the believers in
total interoperability's resulting primarily from executive
fiat.
Interoperability in joint operations has taken many
forms, ranging from geographic isolation and coordination
in the 12-minute bombing raid in Libya (where the Air
Force touk the west side and the Naval pilots the east) to
the use of an ATO in Desert Storm.' An obvious observa-
tion: when one service component uses another service's
component to strike mutual targets radar must tell each
olpw* - Iow
J -;- -.
24 INTEROPERABIUTY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY
force's commander what the other force is doing. To ac-
complish this critical objective, Tactical Digital Information
Links (TADILS, see Appendix B) Voice Systems, the
Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF), and Tactical Air
Navigation (TACAN) were designed.
JTIDS is a nodeless, many-to-many architecture, based
on the Time Division Multiple Access design, which uses
TADIL J to increase the performance of C2 over joint
forces. With JTIDS, messages can be transmitted over an
extended range of 500 miles. Its antijam capability results
from the use of spread spectrum and frequency-hopping
techniques."
Thousands of participants can be on the link at any one
time, which results from the TDMA design. This feature led
one observer to characterize JTIDS as "a disc drive in the
sky."42 Other features include position location and identifi-
cation to JTIDS-equipped elements and a secure system that
provides participants with digitized voice capability.
Hill and Ulrich summarized the importance of JTIDS as
follows:
The JTIDS can assist in achieving interoperability among the
Services for a wide range of applications. Its deployment on a
variety of airborne, shipboard, and ground platforms allows
communication of both voice and data among the combatants
as well as providing a common grid to these participants. The
JriDS will provide an effective means of coordinating tactical
assault and defense activities.
From the history and evolution of JTIDS it is apparent
that a joint product, system, effort, or process is bound to
run into obstacles from its inception. In the case of JTIDS,
which has yet to be fully funded and developed, there was
a major conflict between the Air Force and the Navy over
_ __II ,__ _
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TDMA versus DTDMA.43 The Air Force preferred the
TDMA architecture, being concerned with ground-based
jammers and the necessity for the hardware to fit in fighter
aircraft. The Navy supported DTDMA to protect its carrier-
based battle groups against airborne jamming. Were it not
for a DOD/OSD fiat in 1975, which followed a bitterly
contested battle, the two services might have had their own
systems, or stovepipes, but still not have been able to
commrtunicate with each other, according to Hill and Ulrich.
As it turned out the Air Force was selected as the executive
agent for JTIDS utilizing TDMA.
* Are there possible, even probable, similarities between
the Air Force/Navy account above and CI for the
Warrior's prescription for assigning the JCS Chairman "the
responsibility for achieving interoperability among the
services?" Continuing, "Through the Military and Commu-
nications and Electronics Board (MCEB) and in accordance
with the policies of the ASD [Assistant Secretary of
Defense, C31], that responsibility will be focused on
identifying and resolving interoperability and standard-
ization issues relevant to joint and combined operations."
Similarly, a "Quick Fix Phase" in the same document, calls
for "adherence to a common set of joint standards, rigorous
testing for conformance and configuration management
enforcement."
What is the likelihood of such an agreement? If you
were to mastermind such conformance what elements would
you like to control? Is financial control over acquisitions
adequate? Does the JCS have the required clout with DOD
and Congress to prevent "end runs" by services? Is this
really the beginning of jointness for interoperability? If not,
what obstacles do you see ahead and how would you
forestall or overcome them?
/ Ii
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7 IRIDIUM
Motorola's futuristic telecommunications network of 77
satellites, as originally planned, was named IRIDIUM after
the chemical element with an atomic number of 77. Since
then, the original design the number of satellites has been
!) reduced to 66, and the system's transponders have been re-
, duced from 48 to 37. These reductions were to diminish the
coverage of the polar regions with their minuscule popula-
tions, thereby reducing costs. Whether Motorola will change
the name of the system to Dysprosium, the chemical
element with an atomic number of 66 is doubtful given the
amount of publicity already accorded to IRIDIUM. On the
other hand, the word Dysprosium, a rare earth metallic
element, is derived from the Greek dyspros(itos) which
means "hard to get at." Literally, a satellite system like
Motorola's might justifiably bear such a name.
The satellites will orbit the earth at a relatively low
altitude of 413 miles to assure communications with hand-
held radio telephones on the earth. This digital, cellular
system will allow anyone on earth to reach anyone else on
earth within reach of a telephone, regardless of location.
Constructed from off-the-shelf technology it is supposed to
be working in 1993-94. The government sector is expected
to use 18 percent of its capacity; business and private
sectors 42 percent and 40 percent, respectively. The satel-
lite-based network will provide both terrestrial communica-
tions and coverage within an altitude of 100 miles. IRIDI-
UM is expected to serve millions of users, ten times the
number now served by geosynchronous systems."
Motorola has gone one step further in announcing a new
pocket-sized device, named InfoTACH, that allows users of
laptop and notebook computers to send and receive data
over ARDIS, a national network operated by Motorola and
_ _ _
_
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IBM.4 s Does this complement IRIDIUM?
A more recent development is Globalstar, a subsidiary
of L'Oral. Globalstar will provide telecommunication
services worldwide. The 48 low-orbiting satellites and local
service telephones are scheduled for a 1997 debut.'
Given CIM's objective to use more off-the-shelf
technology, to say nothing of C'!for the Warrior's inten-
idons, should Congress, through military appropriations be
supporting IRIDIUM? Given the reduction in the number
of satellites and transponders, would the military be
justified in subsidizing the costs of IRIDIUM to gain
uniform worldwide coverage? In the event, how would you
allocate the developmental and operating costs, to say
nothing of sharing profits? Or, should IRIDIUM remain
totally in the private sector? What are the real differences
between the public and private sectors as far as
interoperability is concerned? Is it probable that IRIDIUM's
projected governmental sector share of 18 percent is too
low? On what basis would you predict market share by
sector of use? Within what range of error?
8 Cyberspace, the Infosphere,
i and Interoperablllty
Cyberspace, a term for electronic space,47 invites study,
especially as it relates to the four information processes or
functions: generating, organizing, transmitting, and archiv-
ing. Interoperability evolves from these functions to
facilitate military decisionmaking. As we reflect on
information and decisionmaking, we are reminded of their
complexities. Yet seemingly simple goals such as "total
interoperability" mask many of the complexities of decid-
ing how and when to meet such objectives. The complexi-
ties are diverse and often territorial, as demonstrated by the
_ _ _ _ _ _
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Air Force/Navy argument over multiple access alternatives.
Consequently, matters of jointness extend well beyond
hardware compatibility, for instance. Because the spatial
boundaries of information could border on the infinite,
information is all the more difficult to manage. Neverthe-
less, "Cyberspace is a frontier where territorial rights are
being established and electronic environments are being
S~differentiated."'' Military information management has
already migrated into that frontier.
Will demands for increased interoperability create
unique problems or will existing public and private sector
models for controlling information suffice? Who will
arbitrate future information overlaps between the two
sectors or will existing agencies like the Federal Communi-
cations Commission manage? Should some bandwidths be
reserved for future needs? On what basis? Who should
decide? When? Where?
"The INFOSPHERE, from C'lfor the Warrior, contains
the total combination of information sources, fusion centers,
and distribution systems that represent the C41 resources a
warfighter needs to pursue his operational objectives."
Does this statement from C'I for the Warrior portend
anything different or unusual about the future need for
global capabilities along the lines of C2 in general and
interoperability in particular? If it does, what should be
considered?
Future battles will utilize information more than ever
before. Additionally, the rules of engagement will differ
radically from the past because of the computer. In this
regard, consider the offensive use of computer viruses and
worms to destroy an enemy's war-making capabilities
without launching a single missile.
The cleanliness of such tactics with little or no loss of
human life would be welcomed. The devastation would be iI
t-.-..-- -
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primarily economic: retaliation might attempt to destroy the
computerized elements of a nation's banks, its airline
1 reservation systems, its telecommunications networks, and
its air traffic control processes.
Were these basic utilities to go out, a nation would be
I istopped and its more conventional war-fighting assets
would be valueless, except for war surplus materiel.
These are some of the implications of attempting to
achieve a high degree of interoperability in the present and
forthcoming Infosphere. No longer science fiction, the
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REFUEL/GUPPY 07/6307A/MANGO PST HIGH/ALT:200/24233OZ/20/TAI)07//
P.EW4ELGUPPY 10/6310A/MANGO PST HIGH/ALT: 2O5/24233OZ/20/TAD1O//
AMPN/ REMARK IDENTIFIER(S) * A E V/I
XSNDAT/3021C/ZAF/ROVER 22./4F16/1INT/-/4CS72/-/23022./36441//
TGTtWC/24003OZ/24004OZ/-/SUPPLY/3o1623NO472624E/2MO971Z//
REFUEW/GUPPY 07/6307A/MANGO PST HIGH/ALT: 200/242345Z/2O/TADO7//'
REFUEWOGUPPY 10/6310A/MANGO PST HIGH/ALT: 205/24234$Z/20/TALD1O//
Ai4IN/ REMARK IDENI!IFIER CS): A I V//
MSNDAT/0501F/EAF/HUSKIZ 01/SF2.6/INT/-/2MS42/-/2O5O1/36401//
TGTLO0C/24053OZ/240545Z/31327CANC09/TUNNEL/334822 .9N442714 .9E//
RtFUEL/WALLEYE 14/63143/RAILROAD PRE/ALT: 200/240320Z/90/TAD14//.
REFUEL/PIKE 26/63265/RAILROAD PST/ALT: 200/240600Z/56/TAD26//
?.MPN/ REMARK IDENTIFIER(S): A c r P Q//
NARR/ UNIT REMARKS: 388TFW
UNIT REMARKS A
SEE TANKER SPINS FOR AAR INFO.
UNIT REMARKS C
CONTACT CENTRAL AWACS.* USE CENTRAL COMM4 PLAN.
UNIT REMARKS 2
CONTACT EAST AWACS, USE EAST COMM PLAN.
UNIT REMARK F
IF TGT WX PREVENTS EXPENDING ON PRIMARY TOT, PLAN MEDIUM ALT RETURN
ROUTE OVER GUARDS AREA. TOT COORDS WILL BE PASSED FROM ASARS VIA
UNIT REMARKS P 055,SFi,.T7),06W4F-) 7X
YOU ARE PACKAGE COMMANDER.
UNIT REMARKSV
IF ACTIVE SAM SITE OBSERVED PRIOR TO ATTACK, ATTACK SAM SI~TE. DO
NOT TROLL FOR SAMS. KILL ZONE AF7 NE IF PRIMARY TOT NOT ACQUIRED,
UNIT REMARKS W




AMPN/ REMARK IDENTIFIER(S): A 3 C D E//
MSNDAT/5213S/ZZP/R9AVlR 13/35520/INT/-/4 517L/--/25213/35333//
TOTLIOC/242020Z/242100Z/50427-011OS/PWRSTm/3632.22NOsa4523W//
ANPN/ REMARK ID ENT IFIER(S): A B C D X//
NARR/ UNIT REMARKS: SOIPBW
UNIT REMARKS A
SEAD, CAP, SWEEP, COWE, SAFE PASSAGE, AND AIR RIFULING MUST BE
COORDINATED WITH JTF.
UNIT ROLMA= 5
SQUAWKS ARE FOR LEAD AIRCRAFT.
UNIT REMARKS C
ADUSTNENS TO TOTS, PACKAGE AND MISSION NUMBERS, AND SQUAWKS MAY
33 MADE PER 3T7 DIRECTION. CENTAF WILL TRACK YOUR MISSION WITH
CINYAF ALLOCATED DATA.
*UNIT REMARKS D
IADVISE 17A0 (STRATFOR DomUER PLANS) ASAP oF ANy DEVATONS FROM ATo.
UNIT REMARKS E
"ATERAT9 TARGET IS EW SITE. 33 1340CAC393
* ~OUWICTVE-DISTROY/DAMAGE ATENNAS * AND SUPPORT BUILDINGS//
TASVUNIT/2.612 KAS//
36 IN1TEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY
ATOCONF ATOCONF
ANNEX 33TO CHAPTER 3
AIR TASKING ORDER/CONFIRMATION (ATOCONF)
1. GENERAL
The ATOCONP Ie used to task Intra-sorvice organizations, to Inform the requesting command
and the teasking authority of the action being taken, and/or to provide additional Information
about the mission(s).
If tile message requires changes or corrections. a Message Ctange Report may be iced,
The chanqes may be transmlitted as another ATOCONIF message idenltified as a derviation In
Field S of the UISGIC set. uslnq a REP set to identify the original ATOCONF message, The ,
PEND~ set specifies the period fee which the message It effective.
This measage Inciudes the effsetiv time period, tasked unit(s), and basic mission Information:t
mission number, request number, priority, mission typ, time on and off target alert statue,
location, cail sign. numbef and type of sircraft, ordnance type, IMrSIF mode an'S code, and
time and target location.
2. MESSAGE MAPI
EXEZR/exerciso name/aaditionall Identified/I
OPERI/operation name/plan orig'nator and nurnberloption name/second option name//
MiSGIO/ATOCONFlorgignatorlmotsage aeriai mum berlmonlh/quaiifler/quailfler seriai number/I
REF/seriall ietterl(usmntf message short ttlta) or (type of rsference)Ioriginiatort/deate*.timemgroup
1(msg sotr n'imber) or (DOCSN: doc scr number)Ispclcia notation/Caic) or (filing number)l//
AMPN/free text to explain preceding reference set/I
NAR~Pfres text to explain preceding reference st/I
CANXI(uamtf message short thisi) or (type of reference)/crlc'inatorldato-tims group
/(mesaage) or (document) serial number/specIal notation/(sic) or (filing numberyjI
PEFOO/Itme from/TO: tnie to/ASOF: as of time/I
AIRTASK~aIr tasking/sir ltasking comments/I
TA.SKUNITtainked unit designstor(ICAO location/comments/l
IWSNOIAT/mIealon numberitpackago identlfIcatIon/alrcraft call sign/number and type aircraft
/Imssion tyelaler status/primary configuration cude/secondlaiy configuration code
/lffelf code and mode/I
IMNLOC/misalon satrt day-timofmission atop day-tIme/miasion location name
/(aititudo) or (flight level/aIr siipport request ntrmber/cfeal coordnates//
TOfL.OC/day-time on target/day-time off targeVt&tcrget Idertiflor/torget typ
Ie/ed*I mean point of impact/ak support request number/targeit comments/-
%OA etnubrmno priority/day-time on target/latest time information of value
/reoin.omianeri mission typo//
ThCPLO1TAocatlon of Initial point/typle ares/trace point locatlon/I
CONTROt~type of contro~cllasilgni(pzimary, frequency) or (primary freqiuency designaltor)
1(secondary frequency) or (becondary freqiusecy designator)/report-in point/cont'ol commentil/I
3-33-1 ReV151akn 4.0, Oct '991 3-33-1
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ATOCONF ATOCONF
FACINF01callsign/primsfY (frequency) or (frequency deslilnator)
Isecondery (frequency) or (frequency deslgnstor)/report.in point/support unit Identity
/control comments//
LECMTI/elraraft gall sign/prorlty/mlsslon iocatloni(altltude) or (flight teve)l/tlme on seation
/tlme off ststlon/primary (frequency) or frequency designator)
/seeondary (frequency) or (frequency designator)//
PUMtA~nker call sign/tanker misslon number/air refueling control point
/(ltitrud) or (flight levef)/alr refueling control time/total off-load of fuel
/(prlmer• frequency) or (frequency designator)/secondavy (frequency) or (frequency
deslgnalee/I
?RVUFL
IJUSNNO /ACSION I INOTPAC /OFF . IMCT irNKN /FUEL /CIMNT
m "ln a*Craft Inumber and tot el refuelng I tanker reuIng (et
number call sign type/model of off-ioad control time assignment fuel type comments/
aircraft lu
AIQ4LDG/&knldg/(PNST: aknldg instructions) or (force or unit required to aknidg)/I
OEC./downgalling instructions//
NOTE: U~ts PEND. AIRTASK, TASKUNIT, and MSNOAT are mandatory. You also must use
one (but only one) of sets MSNLOC, TGTLOC, and RECOATA.
3. ENTRY uSTS
The ATOCONF uses the following entry lists,
USLT NUM TiU
11 t Locttlon




2005 AW Tasklng Type
t 3,33-2 RaVAsIon 4.0. Oct 1991 3-33-2
ii
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ATOCONF ATOCONF
PSRZD/3OO0 .Z/TO 3jf359Z/AS0F 1093OZ//
AIRTASX/PAC&j4.E/dr//
TAhSlCTJ4T/IUW/ 6OX/WEAPONlS ONFGURATZON CHkARLTE//
I ~~~U I.- ... w ijq
jM3ND?4T/AF1O1/ i/XI!4 LEP LO4IL/ /5/ClA0/11/
THE ABOVE EXAMPLE IS NOT INTENDED TO DEPICT AN ACTUAL
MESSAGE. USE IT AS A GUIDE FOR COMPLETING INDIVIDUAL SETS.
Number ofS T CAT Charctes EXPLANATN
IELD NAME 3 F
a 1.20X place name (town. terrain feature, eec.)
comments o 1 .-6X Enter additional comments concerning the tasked unit.
If ou need more space, add a free-text set.
NOTE: Sets MSNOAT through TREFUEL form a
nestlad segment. Repeat them as a g•r•i; 1o report
multiple unit tasking. You must repait the sets In
thlelrorglnal order. You must Include the mardatory
sets In each topetltion.
MSNOAT m Use this set to give basic task:nglconflrmation
Informaton for air missions.
mission num m 1.-X Enter the rda~on rmumber.
package id m 1.3ANS Enter the package IdentIfication number for the
a- lgred mission.
call lgn fl, 1.12X Enter thj call sign assi ned to the mission aircraft.
notpse m 3-1ANS Enter the number and type of aircraft as follows:
i.2N * Enter the number of aircraft.
24ANS • Then enter the code for aircraft tyFe"/model.
mnmisau type en 2.SAN Enter the type of mlsslon.
__________ - ~ ~~ 191 NTRY LJST IoJiin r Z...... .....
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ATOCONF ATOCONF
S SET NAME CAT ~~4fO
ama status M 24AN Enter the alan statusl from one of the folowing:
ALERT STATUS CODE
Alen time Orne-wodigiltatllowetid





Pod (25 mink for RED
Marin units)
White 040 mn for %wT
Other (emtalnlIn 0TR
"a re-terd sot)
primay m I -SAN Enter the primary configuration Qode for the sircrult.
corifig code
secands.1 m I-SAN Enter the secondary configuration code for the aircrAt.config code(
b~Weotcdo m 3-IAN Enter thelIFFP/atP(denication Friend a oar~o.lec"
Identification Feature) mode anid code asflwm
IAN * Enterthemods(I,.Zor3)
2-4N 0 Then enter the cide: 00-0. 10-13 thrrugh 70.73
for Mode 1;0000-7777 (omit B's and f a) for modes&
AISNLOC c
r This sto is mandatory it TQTLOC or FICOATA eam not
use. Enter mission locatin Information.
milatt m IAN Enter the mission sma time vsin two digits each for
day, hour, minute end one low er fo time zoo,.
Instep in ?AN Ente the mission atop time using two digits each kor
day, hour, minute and one letter for the MOne
location 0 1-lox Enter the notie for the mission loation
ALM a W-N Enter the laid dsecrtipto. then fte ~au in hn
OR
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APPENDIX B THE TADIL COMIMUNICATIONS LINK
A TADIL, according to Hill and Ulrich, is "a JCS approved
standardized communications link suitable for transmission of digital
information and characterized by standardized message formats and
"transmission atributes."36 Since these two factors are standardized,
two or more operational centers, for example, weapon systems, can be
connected. TADILS, utilizing computers, can pass the shared data in
digital form among tactical forces C2 units at or near real-time. Then the
processed information can be shown on either symbolic situation or
alphanumeric tabular displays.
Variations of TADILs that have been developed include:
D3 TADIL A, a secure, netted data link, used by the Navy
primarily to exchange and broadcast, air, surface, and subsurface tracks
between ships. It can also support electronic warfare. The architecture
is many-to-many or one player can send and receive tracks to and from
all players.
0 TADIL B, a secure, point-to-point data link utilizing serial
transmission frame characteristics and standard message formats. Its
prime purpose is to connect tactical air defense and air control units.
Being a serial system, it passes information from one player to another
to another, etc. This one-to-one architecture differs from TADIL A.
O TADIL C, a time division multiple access data transmission
(TDMA)l link between a control station and controlled aircraft. Used
primarily by the Navy for automatic transmission of orders, status, and
other information to interceptors. The link architecture is one-to-many
and many-to-one or a message can be broadcast by one control station
to many aircraft with all of the aircraft being able to respond to one
control station.
TADILS A, B, and C offer proven advantages, as indicated above.
However, none of them can be protected against jamming, and TADIL
C is not secure, Also, processing time is somewhat limited as is the
number of players per link: TADIL A, 20 players; TADIL B, two
players and TADIL C, eight players.
Voice systems are generic, common to all combat elements with
many-to-many architecture if the players are tuned to the same
a 1 0 - i
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11 frequency. Typically they are not secure nor do they offer jamming
protection. However the new Mark XV 1EP system is designed to
provide jam protection for the ETIDS identification system.2
I IFF systems include interrogators, transponders, processing
equipment, and related antenna systems enabling airciaft to identify
themselves to air defense sites or other aircraft.
* TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation) system provides an aircraft with
a position location relative to a ground-based TACAN transponder.
Once a position is determined, pilots using TACAN maps determine
their grid location. Its architecture is many-to-one and one-to-many.
Since the location is relative to the transponder for a particular aircraft,
a common grid among aircraft may not be possible.
Eight criteria may be used for evaluating the components of an
Existing Tactical Information Distribution Systems (ETIDS): (1)
jamming protection; (2) security; (3) capacity, i.e., number of
participants per link at any one time; (4) information flow, i.e., ability
of system to deliver information from one person to another, (5)
interoperability, i.e., ability of system components to talk and transmit
information to each other; (6) common grid, i.e., the participants'
common reference point; (M survivability, i.e., the system's ability to
continue providing users with information after the loss of a piece of
the system; (8) coverage, the distance information can be transmitted.
None of the TADILS, Voice, TACAN, nor IFF systems meet all of
these criteria or ideal objectives. Even considering interoperability, some
services have some compatible equipment but they do not share
common procedures and codes. Consequently, the TADILS had to be
constantly refined to meet the objective of a joint control and
identification system that allowed many users to participate over great
distances with secure messages and jam protection. TADIL J was
developed for these purposes.
NOTESj 1. Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) is the most popular method
for separating channels or users on a common communication medium.
Essentially, TDMA architecture provides time slots for message traffic.
Assignments to the slots are accomplished by a Net Time Reference
(NTR) terminal which also refers such assignments to the nodes.
_______________________________________________________________
II ,''•'i,' ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _t r r'*z ~ ~ .- ,,.~,**-.-
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2. Mark XV is also known as SINGARS (Single Channel Ground Air
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General Lesley James McNair. General McNair, known as
"Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three million troops,
was about to take command of Allied ground forces in Europe
under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy,
25 July 1944.
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